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Japanese Reinterpretations of Confucianism:  
Itō Jinsai and His Project1 
Marko OGRIZEK* 
Abstract
This article aims to introduce the study of Itō Jinsai from the point of view of the value of 
his Confucian interpretations within the context of the project of Confucian ethics—in 
other words, trying to ascertain in what ways Jinsai’s project can help facilitate the study 
of Confucian ethics beyond the realm of intellectual history in the global context of the 
21st century. It is imperative to allow Jinsai’s notions, as much as possible, to speak for 
themselves; but it is also of great importance to first place Jinsai within his own time and 
inside the intellectual space in which he formulated his ideas. A number of scholarly 
sources will be considered, with the intention of illuminating Jinsai’s work from a few 
different angles.
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Izvleček
Članek je uvod v študij Itōja Jinsaija z vidika vrednosti njegovih konfucijanskih inter-
pretacij v kontekstu projekta konfucijanske etike – z drugimi besedami, ugotoviti poskuša, 
kako lahko Jinsaijev projekt pripomore k študiju konfucijanske etike onkraj intelektualne 
zgodovine, v globalnem kontekstu 21. stoletja. Jinsaijevim pojmom moramo nujno do-
voliti, da spregovorijo sami zase; vendar pa je zelo pomembno, da Jinsaija najprej umes-
timo v njegov čas in intelektualni prostor, v katerem je osnoval svoje ideje. Upoštevani so 
različni akademski viri, s katerimi avtor Jinsaijevo delo osvetli z več različnih zornih kotov. 
Ključne besede: Itō Jinsai, japonski konfucianizem, tradicionalna japonska filozofija, etika
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Introduction
As will be developed in the present article, a study of Jinsai’s life and works shows 
that Jinsai’s views on the Analects and the Confucian Way, though sometimes pre-
sented in a radical fashion, did not come about abruptly and were not based solely 
in doctrinal objections. Jinsai in fact worked his way diligently as a student—from 
studying the Neo-Confucian thought of the Cheng-Zhu School, to trying to find 
solutions to his personal crisis in both Buddhism and Daoism; through a slow 
disillusionment with Neo-Confucian concepts of both the Cheng-Zhu as well as 
the Yang Wangming School, and in the end settling on thoroughly analyzing the 
Four Books themselves, especially the Analects and Mencius. 
The present article therefore aims to argue that while Jinsai’s position may have 
first been based on certain textual concerns, his attitudes towards the “heterodox-
ies” of Buddhism and Daoism were developed both concurrently with his philo-
sophical ideas as well as his ideas on proper ethical practice; and that while the lat-
ter was perhaps his more enduring motivation for the critique of Neo-Confucian 
thought, it may actually have been necessitated by his search for a universally valid 
Confucian ethics, based on the secular and every-day experience of the people.
As different scholars of Jinsai also stress different features of his work, a study 
of different scholarly sources should help illuminate as many aspects of Jinsai’s 
thought as possible. 
Itō Jinsai as Kogakuha 古学派 (The School of Ancient Learning)
It is usual in Japanese historiography to categorize the scholars of the Edo period, 
who identified themselves as Confucians, into three factions: Shushigaku 朱子学 
(Zhu Xi Learning), Yōmeigaku 陽明学 (Wang Yangming Learning) and Kogaku 
古学 (Ancient Learning). In this triad Jinsai is seen as belonging to the Ancient 
Learning faction of Japanese Confucian scholars—a group, whose best-known 
members also include Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行 (1622–1685) and Ogyū Sorai 荻
生徂徠 (1666–1728). 
Kiri Paramore notes that these categories were seldom applied strictly in the his-
torical reality of the Tokugawa period, but that they became reified by historians 
of the 20th century, notably Inoue Tetsujirō and Maruyama Masao (Paramore 
2016, 194, note 2)—by focusing mostly on the ideas of different Confucian-iden-
tified figures of the time. He also notes that while there is some utility to such 
an approach as a means of linking different trends in Japanese Confucianism to 
continental trends, analyzing the relationships between different interpretations 
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of Tokugawa Confucianism only through these kinds of categorizations occludes 
many of the most socially and culturally significant aspects of Confucianism’s leg-
acy in Japan (ibid., 43).
Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, who as mentioned above helped popularize such 
categorizations, admits in his “Author’s Introduction” to Mikiso Hane’s transla-
tion of Studies in Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (1974) that his original 
essays were flawed in many ways, especially in not taking into account important 
distinctions between the Japanese and the Chinese schools, as well as ignoring 
important influences like Korean Neo-Confucianism2 (Maruyama 1974, xxxiv–
xxxv). Another problem of categorization for this thesis comes from the criteria 
used. While Sokō, Jinsai and Sorai might all have been critical of what they per-
ceived as the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy through the lens of returning to the classi-
cal Chinese texts, their ideas were hardly identical in their intentions and conse-
quences; nor where the texts to which they ascribed authority the same. Jinsai, for 
example, never wrote of Sokō’s work and while Sorai did write of Jinsai’s, it was 
mostly to criticize him harshly.
Another approach, taken by Paramore himself, is also possible: that instead of 
focusing on the differences of thought of the different factions, he tries to identify 
similarities in practice. He argues that “despite coming from a range of different 
intellectual schools of Confucianism, and disagreeing with each other on many 
theoretical issues, in terms of practice, context, and sociality, the Way of Heaven 
teachings, and the Confucianism of all these figures shared (…) similarities” (Par-
amore 2016, 44)3. But among the figures Paramore goes on to discuss in more de-
tail, Itō Jinsai is notably absent.
As Jinsai was not a samurai and did not write directly of or to the samurai class, 
his ethics are presented in universal terms, with indirect political messages. John 
Allen Tucker sees this as being representative of a worldview belonging to the Edo 
period townspeople (chōnin 町人) class, which was by necessity more inclusive 
and more diverse (Tucker 1998). Jinsai also does not overtly connect Confucian 
2 This is also remarked upon by Tucker in Tucker (1997b, 529).
3 “1. A clear focus on Neo-Confucian practice as outlined in key texts edited by Zhu Xi in the Song, 
and developed through practice in Ming dynasty China: notably the “Method of the Heart” (xin-
fa). 2. A syncretist tendency to present Neo-Confucian practice in relation to, or even as, Shin-
toism, Military Thought, or other indigenous-Japanese non-Buddhist traditions. 3. A vision of 
post-Han contemporary imperial Chinese society as a completely separate and ruptured society 
from the ideal historic Confucian age of Yao and Shun. 4. A related capacity to create a space for 
Japanese nationalist sensibilities and to criticize contemporary imperial China from a Confucian 
perspective. 5. Use of Neo-Confucianism to give meaning to the life of samurai in the new peaceful 
Tokugawa order. 6. Criticized by others as potentially or actually politically subversive.” (ibid.)
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practice to Shintoism or other indigenous-Japanese traditions—as Huang Chun-
chieh notes, Jinsai’s descriptions of the Confucian dao are turned to the everyday 
and the secular (Huang 2008). As Maruyama notes, Jinsai sees Dao as universal-
ly human, but also sees the world as historically evolved—he does not see it in a 
post-Golden Age time of the decline of the Way (Maruyama 1974); and it is true 
that Jinsai did himself keep a fairly low profile, possibly in fear of being criticized 
by others as potentially or actually politically subversive (Tucker 1998).
I would therefore argue that Jinsai does not fit as easily into Paramore’s analysis of 
the commonalities of Confucian-identified thinkers in Japan. The value of both of 
these kinds of categorizations is thus limited in this context, and the approach I 
propose to take is more in line with analyzing internal similarities and differences 
of Jinsai’s thought with the thought of those predecessors whose works he him-
self had engaged with, without prejudging the outcome. I also do not intend to 
discount different interpretations of Jinsai’s own work out of hand, as they might 
each present important aspects of his project. I therefore merely propose to re-ex-
amine and try to synthesize these different views on Jinsai as they pertain to his 
philosophical work, while holding an open-minded stance on the different gener-
alizations and categorizations already offered.
The views presented above need to be examined one by one, not to judge which of 
them may have had a greater influence on Jinsai, but to show that in fact Jinsai’s 
project does in certain ways evade strict delineation. Certain aspects of Jinsai’s 
work could thus even be called contradictory, but his project as a whole exhibits a 
high level of integrity.
Jinsai’s Project as Facilitating the Dissolution of the Zhu Xi Mode of 
Thought
Maruyama Masao is widely considered as one of the most influential post-World 
War II Japanese scholars associated with the history of Japanese Confucianism. 
He was a University of Tokyo professor of political science and of history of polit-
ical thought who idealized Western liberalism (Paramore 2016, 168). One of his 
two most famous works, Nihon seiji shisō kennkyū 日本政治思想研究, published 
in the form of short essays in the years before the war, then as a book in Japanese 
in 1952, later again translated as the Studies in Intellectual History of Tokugawa Ja-
pan by Mikiso Hane in 1974, describes the history of the political and philosoph-
ical role of Confucianism in early modern Japan. 
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Paramore notes:
Although presented (…) as a history of Confucian thought, the book’s 
points were deeply political and present (ibid.). As Maruyama himself 
wrote in an introduction to a later printing, the book was his answer and 
resistance to the ‘overcoming modernity’ and ‘national morality’ ideolo-
gies of the wartime fascist state (Maruyama 1974, ix, xxx, xxxi). He thus 
used the history of Confucianism in Japan as the central plank in his 
argument against the fascist nationalism. (ibid.)
Maruyama’s book, understood within this context, may have lost much of its orig-
inal interpretative power, but even if its main premise has been shown to be based 
on flawed assumptions (and as already pointed out, Maruyama himself has ad-
mitted to this to a certain extent), the book can still offer insight into the specif-
ic nature of the work of different scholars presented in it. The infamous schema 
in which a pure version of the Zhu Xi mode of thought is transplanted to Ja-
pan, where the eventual changes in political reality bring about its dissolution—as 
completed by the formation of the Sorai School, its antithesis—remains always 
in the background of any study of Maruyama’s views on the kogaku scholars, but I 
would still follow Maruyama’s own line of thinking, when he writes:
From the perspective of the present day, there is room for a good deal of 
doubt how far the evolutionary schema implicit in the first two essays—
of universal Zhu Xi type Neo-Confucian mode of thought followed by 
its gradual disintegration, or of a transition in emphasis from “nature” to 
“invention”—will actually stand up to the historical evidence. However, 
I like immodestly to think even if one totally discards the whole schema, 
several individual pieces of analysis (…) still have value as providing a 
basis for further research. (Maruyama 1974, xxxv)
Bearing the above in mind, I would like to set out Maruyama’s specific obser-
vations of Jinsai’s work.4 I do not argue here either for or against Maruyama’s 
observations.
a) Jinsai sought to purify Confucian ethical philosophy by emphasizing the 
normative aspects of the system (ibid., 51). His stated aim was to rescue Confu-
cianism from its decline into a merely contemplative philosophy by reinforcing its 
practico-ethical character (ibid., 52).
4 Mikiso Hane’s translation is lightly edited to better reflect my own use of the different philosoph-
ical terms in the text.
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b) Jinsai made clear distinctions between categories such as the Way of 
Heaven (tendō 天道), the Way of Humanity (rendao/jindō 人道), the Decree of 
Heaven (tainming/tenmei 天命), structural coherence (li/ri 理), humaneness (ren/
jin 仁), appropriateness (yi/gi 義), ritual propriety (li/rei 礼), wisdom (zhi/chi 智) 
and the “suchness” of things (xing/sei 性). He confined yin 隠 and yang 陽, as cat-
egories of the natural world, exclusively to the Way of Heaven, and humaneness 
and appropriateness, as moral categories, exclusively to the Way of Humanity 
(ibid., ed.).
c) Compared with the quiescent, rational view of nature held by the Song 
scholars, Jinsai’s cosmology is strongly vitalistic. Such a view inevitably led Jinsai 
to the denial of the supremacy of li 理 over qi 氣. For Jinsai, li no longer provides 
the link between Heaven and man; it is no more than a “physical principle” (ibid.). 
However, Jinsai’s criticisms of Song philosophers’ theory of li and qi did not, as is 
often argued, confuse the logical priority they claimed for li over qi with a tempo-
ral priority. Rather, he feared that the supremacy accorded li by the Zhu Xi School 
might go beyond a logical supremacy and become a supremacy of value (ibid., 53).
d) Only a small part of Jinsai’s overall philosophical system is concerned 
with his theory of the Decree of Heaven, but its importance in the intellectual 
structure of his philosophy cannot be ignored, as the logical origin of Jinsai’s ag-
nostic tendencies can be traced to it (ibid., 54).
e) By insisting that “there is no way outside of the people, and no people out-
side of the way” (“人の外に道無く、道の外に人無し”) (Itō in Shimizu 2017, 
26), Jinsai hoped to strengthen the ethical side of the Song School’s Way, which 
had been weakened by its extension to cover the natural world (Maruyama 1974, 
55). Having broken the continuity between the Way in general and the Way of 
Heaven, he now made it transcend suchness (xing/sei 性) as well. In Jinsai’s opin-
ion, humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and wisdom are not principles 
endowed upon man by birth, constituting his Original Humanness; they are ideal 
characteristics that men must strive to realize (ibid.). 
f ) However, because he respected Mencius just as much as Confucius and 
could not but support the former’s belief in the goodness of humanness, Jinsai, 
while insisting on regarding humaneness, appropriateness, ritual propriety, and 
wisdom as transcendental ideas, placed the “four sprouts” (si duan 四端) i.e., the 
senses of commiseration (惻隱之心), shame (羞惡之心), compliance (辭讓之心), 
and moral judgement (是非之心), in the realm of humanness. The four sprouts 
are endowed in humanness as predispositions toward the realization of the way, 
which has an objective and autonomous existence (ibid., 55,56; see also Hu 2021).
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g) Although Jinsai emphasized the imperative character of Confucian ethics, 
he was not intolerant of man’s natural desires. For instance, he said, “if we were 
to judge things in terms of ritual propriety and appropriateness, we would find 
that feelings (jō 情) conform to the way and desires (yoku 欲) to appropriateness. 
There is nothing wrong with them.” (trans. Hane in Maruyama 1974, 57, ed.) 
(“苟しくも禮義以て之を裁することあるときは、則ち情則ち是れ道、欲
則ち是れ義、何んの悪むことか之れ有らん。” (Itō in Shimizu 2017, 98)) 
And, though happy to remain in abject poverty all his life, also remarked: 
Confucians pride themselves on showing little interest in monetary com-
pensations and holding wealth and rank to be worth no more that dust 
and dirt. Society in general also respects those who hold mundane af-
fairs in disdain and maintain an attitude of transcendence and aloofness. 




を知らざるの甚だしきなり。(Itō in Shimizu 2017, 45–46)
h) Jinsai said: “If the sages were born in the present age, they would rely 
on the common ways of today and employ methods of today” (trans. Hane in 
Maruyama 1974, 59) (“若し成人をして今の世に生まれしめば、亦必ず今の
俗に因り、今の法を用いる” (Itō in Shimizu 2017, 109)). The emphasis on the 
importance of the historical development of the rites and music shows that the 
quiescent immobile rationalism of the Zhu Xi School had lost its hold on Jinsai’s 
mind. Just as Jinsai the “moralist” was not moralistic, so Jinsai of the School of 
Ancient Learning did not believe that civilization had steadily declined since the 
days of the sages and that it was approaching its demise (Maruyama 1974, 59–60).
i) There are clear signs in Jinsai’s thought of the disintegration of individual 
morality and government. For example, Jinsai said:
A scholar must of course regulate his life in terms of these ideals, but the 
ruler must have as his basic principle a willingness to share the good and 
the bad with his subjects. Of what advantage would it be for the art of 
government if he aimlessly studied the principle of the upright mind and 
sincere intentions but was unable to share the good and the bad with his 
subjects? (trans. Hane in Maruyama 1974, 60)
學者の如きは、固に此を以て自ら修めずんばあるべからず。人
君に在っては、則ち當に民と好惡を同じゅうするを以て本と爲
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べし。其れ徒らに誠心誠意を知って、民と好惡を同じゅうする
こと能わずんば、治道に於て何んの益かあらん。(Itō in Shimizu 
2017, 106)
As has been remarked, and can now be seen, Maruyama traces Jinsai’s thought 
from the point of view of opposition to what Maruyama himself calls “the Zhu 
Xi mode of thought”. In all these different instances he tries to show ways in 
which to present Jinsai as a stepping stone between the Zhu Xi School and Sorai 
School—between the consciousness of the “natural” and the consciousness of the 
“artificial”, the consciousness of the “public” and the consciousness of the “person-
al”. While these interpretations do not seem to represent wrong readings of Jinsai 
per se, the underlying thread does seem to finally overreach; and at the same time, 
to limit the interpretative range (as has been established). 
I would also argue that reading Jinsai too strongly in relation to Sorai, while use-
ful in certain ways, may conceal important distinctions of Jinsai’s own thought 
in many others. As Jinsai could never answer Sorai’s aggressive critique (having 
passed away before he could respond to the famous letter), it is hard to say how 
the dialogue between the two scholars would go and how the main points of dis-
agreement would be hashed out in person. I do contend that perhaps some of the 
most important parts of Jinsai’s work—his own brand of humanism, agnosticism, 
and even liberalism—cannot be given adequate attention and value by trying to 
show him strictly in the same intellectual movement as Sorai.
In this sense, I follow John Allen Tucker’s more grounded and nuanced study.
Jinsai’s Project as a Philosophical Lexicography
John Allen Tucker points out that even if it is still useful to see Jinsai as one of the 
Kogaku scholars, Maruyama’s formulations of the school are in many ways over-
burdened and there are many links missing between different Kogaku scholars as 
presented by traditional Kogaku scholarship. The most persuasive link between the 
different Kogaku scholars, Tucker argues, might therefore be found in a different 
place: the genre of philosophical lexicography. 
Tucker points out the two important figures of Chinese Neo-Confucianism, who 
might have had the greatest influence upon the genre as well as Kogaku scholars 
in general: 
The impact of two Song Neo-Confucians, Chen Beixi 陳北溪 (1159–
1223) and Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1192), seems to account for the 
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more salient characteristics of the Japanese School of Ancient Learning. 
(Tucker 1993, 701)
Rather than simply following the ideas of the Ancient Learning schools as a sort 
of a true anti-thesis to the Cheng-Zhu mode of thought in Japan, Tucker points 
to an often overlooked relationship between the works and ideas of the Kogaku 
scholars and tries to show that the Kogaku schools, instead of representing a real 
critical break with the Neo-Confucian tradition, in fact represent a sort of radical 
Neo-Confucian revisionism—a critical development of certain Neo-Confucian 
methods and ideas, which, though widely used and fitting to the circumstances of 
Tokugawa Japan, were not originally conceived there, but can be traced all the way 
back to China and to Zhu Xi’s own contemporaries. 
Tucker argues that philosophical lexicography, connecting the likes of Yamaga 
Sokō, Kaibara Ekken 貝原 益軒 (1630–1714), Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai, origi-
nated with an important disciple of Zhu Xi, Chen Beixi 陳北溪 (1159–1223) and 
his most important work, the Xingli ziyi 性理字義 (The Meaning of Neo-Confu-
cian Terms). Tucker argues that:
(While) Neo-Confucian texts, such as Zhu Xi’s Sishu jizhu 四書集注 
(Commentaries on the Four Books), had appeared in Japan several centuries 
before the Tokugawa period, Beixi’s Ziyi, a brief, conceptually organized 
primer explaining some-twenty-five philosophical terms and/or groups of 
terms crucial to an elementary understanding of Neo-Confucianism, only 
reached Japan in the 1590s, presumably following Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s 
(1536–1598) first Korean invasion (1592–1593). (Tucker 1993, 683–84)
By then, the Ziyi had been through eight different Chinese editions (ibid., 684), 
but the relevant version of the work, which had the most influence in Edo Japan, 
is the 1553 Korean edition of the text5. This gained widespread popularity through 
the work of Hayashi Razan 林羅山 (1583–1657), one of the most influential 
Confucian teachers in the early Edo period, who also worked on providing a ver-
nacular translation, titled Seiri jigi genkai 性理字義諺解 (Vernacular Explanation 
of the Meaning of Neo-Confucian Terms). By the time the latter was published, 
Beixi’s Ziyi had become one of the most influential Neo-Confucian texts in early 
Tokugawa Japan (ibid.).
Tucker argues that without the Ziyi it would be impossible to imagine works 
such as Yamaga Sokō’s Seikyō yōroku 聖教要録 (Essential Lexicography of Sagely 
5 This was itself apparently a reprint of one of the earliest (if not the earliest) editions, the so-called 
Yuan period 元 (1279–1368) edition (ibid.).
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Confucian Teachings), Itō Jinsai’s Gomō jigi or Ogyū Sorai’s Benmei 辨名 (Distin-
guishing Names) (ibid., 686) and shows how the structure, methodology and cer-
tain ideas are developed within these works. Tucker also points out that even cer-
tain factual mistakes which crop up in Razan’s Genkai can be seen reproduced in 
both Jinsai’s as well as in Sorai’s work (Tucker 1994, 76).
These similarities are not coincidental. Nor can they be explained by any 
other Neo-Confucian text, not to mention one with a publication record 
comparable to that of Beixi’s Ziyi in seventeenth-century Tokugawa Ja-
pan. Zhu Xi’s Commentaries on the Four Books are not arranged around the 
orderly, systematic discussion of the semantics of exclusively philosophi-
cal terms. Rather, Zhu’s Commentaries follow the order of the texts—the 
Great Learning, the Analects, the Mencius, and the Doctrine of the Mean—
which they explicate. Of course, the terms that Beixi discusses do crop 
up, here and there, in Zhu’s Commentaries, but their various appearances 
provide no systematic model for the kind of ordered, lexicographical dis-
cussions found in the terminologically arranged works of Sokō, Jinsai, 
and Sorai. (Tucker 1993, 689)
The second thing Tucker points out about the genre of philosophical lexicography 
in Tokugawa Japan is that while Hayashi Razan popularized the Xingli ziyi, he 
also did it in a critical manner. His Seiri jigi genkai thus also contains Lu Xiang-
shan’s critique of the notion of wuji er taiji / mukyoku ji taikyoku 無極而太極 (“the 
ultimate of non-being and the great ultimate”) as a Daoist (and not a Confucian) 
concept. Razan presents Zhu Xi’s answer to Lu Xiangshan’s critique, but does not 
give an indication as to which of these two interpretations he thinks is the correct 
one, leaving it up to the reader. As neither Lu Xiangshan’s critique, nor Zhu Xi’s 
answer to it are found in Beixi’s Ziyi, Tucker argues that:
(F)rom the start, then, Razan’s brand of Neo-Confucianism (in large part 
expressed for the first time systematically and conceptually in the Gen-
kai) projected an ambivalence wavering toward criticism of notions like 
the ultimate of nonbeing, notions which even in the Song had sparked 
debate, being deemed by thinkers like Lu as dubitable due to their heter-
odox origins. (ibid., 629)
Tucker demonstrates how Jinsai’s own critique of Neo-Confucian terms in the 
Gomō jigi systematically appropriates both Beixi’s ordering of meaning with-
in a philosophical lexicon as well as Lu Xiangshan’s critical analysis of certain 
Neo-Confucian notions. I therefore follow his assertion that both Chen Beixi and 
Azijske_studije_2021_2_FINAL.indd   192 6. 05. 2021   12:47:38
193Asian Studies IX (XXV ), 2 (2021), pp.  183–208
Lu Xiangshan can be taken as proper influences for Jinsai and his work and so 
place Jinsai within a line of scholars, who—though they may not all be connected 
in a simple linear fashion—still share in common the methodology as well as the 
influence of certain ideas found in the genre of philosophical lexicography that 
Hayashi Razan helped to popularize.
Because of the specific juxtaposition of these influences, Tucker also does not be-
lieve that the genre was itself something limiting to the scholars working with it. 
He rather points out: 
Conventional wisdom of course holds that lexicons limit meaning by leg-
islating a rigid version of semantics. Yet in the first flush of unrestrained 
lexicography, Tokugawa philosophers revealed that through lexicography, 
meaning could be endlessly legislated and relegislated, established and 
fractured, defined and then differentiated in an asymptotic quest for fi-
nal, definitive meaning. They showed that lexicography could be easily 
utilized by opponents of a given semantics to establish their own, oppos-
ing estimates of the meanings of words. (Tucker 1994, 77)
Tucker sees the genre itself as an inherently political Confucian project, and as 
the reason why in the Tokugawa period it ended up becoming a sort of an un-
derground movement (ibid., 78). After writing his Seikyō yoroku, Yamaga Sokō, 
“who had never evinced, except in the realm of ideas, the slightest disloyalty to the 
Tokugawa shogunate” (ibid., 71), was exiled from the capital of Edo to the Akō 
domain on the orders of Hoshina Masayuki 保科正之 (1611–1673), the guardian 
of the shogun Ietsuna 徳川家綱 (1641–1680). Hoshina subscribed to the funda-
mentalist school of Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇斎 (1619–1682), whose views were 
antithetic to those of the Kogaku scholars. Ansai was considered the guardian of 
Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, and had by this time managed to supplant even the fa-
mous Hayashi School itself (ibid.).
It is probably for this reason that Jinsai, while he himself never did fall afoul of 
Tokugawa shogunate’s censors like Sokō did, did in fact refrain from publishing 
his most critical works while he was still alive.6 Jinsai’s relationship with the pol-
itics of the day for all intents and purposes remains intellectual, but it is also very 
clear from his writings that he had strong political views, especially supporting 
the politically more liberal ideas of Mencius.7 Jinsai’s ideas might have gotten him 
in trouble, if he was not such a non-openly polemic scholar and if his project had 
6 Though a pirated version of the Gomō jigi did make the rounds and was the version studied by 
Ogyū Sorai.
7 See for example, Tucker (1997, 244–45). 
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been happening anywhere nearer to the capital city. As it was, Jinsai never ven-
tured far outside the City of Kyōto in his life, and his political views remained in 
the realm of his philosophical ideas.
But Tucker argues Jinsai could not have been ignorant of the political realities of 
his time, and that his project also expresses his political views, which are those of 
a Kyōto chōnin.
Jinsai as a Kyōto chōnin Scholar
Setting out Jinsai’s project as less a polemical rejection of Neo-Confucian ideas 
and more a critical revision of them, Tucker explores the possible socio-political 
and biographical elements, which may have influenced Jinsai’s work. He writes:
More than any other teacher or book, Jinsai’s path as a scholar-philosopher 
was influenced by the socio-political environment into which he was born, 
that of Kyoto chōnin in early-Tokugawa Japan. (Tucker 1998, 39)
Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁斎 was born as Itō Genshichi 伊藤源七 on the 20th day of the 
seventh lunar month of Kannei 寛永 4 (August 30, 1627) in Kyōto, Japan, as the 
eldest son of Itō Ryōshitsu 伊藤了室 (1599–1674) and Satomura Nabe 里村那
倍 in his family’s residence, on the east side of the Horikawa Street. The family 
residence stood not far from the imperial palace grounds in north central Kyō-
to and would later become the place of Jinsai’s own school, the Kogidō 古義堂 
(Tucker 1998, 29). As John Allen Tucker notes:
(T)he proximity to the palace and the aristocratic community surround-
ing it facilitated for Jinsai’s Kogidō (…) a following among Kyōto’s social 
elite that few if any other Tokugawa schools, before or after, enjoyed. The 
Itō family was not, however, part of the old stock of Kyōto; rather they 
were newcomers as of the late sixteenth century. (ibid., 29)
Jinsai’s grandfather, Itō Ryōkei 伊藤了慶 (1561–1615), brought scholarship 
into the family home, but could not interest his own children in it (Ishida 1960, 
11). Ryōkei was interested in both the arts and religion, he associated with Zen 
Buddhists, practiced linked verse (renga 連歌) and pursued studies in Confu-
cian thought. The texts that he supposedly owned included copies of important 
Cheng-Zhu texts, such as Zhu Xi’s Sishu 四書 (Commentaries to the Four Books), 
Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian’s 呂祖謙 (1137–1181) Jinsilu 近思錄 (Reflections of Things 
at Hand) and the imperially-sponsored Ming dynasty compilation, the Xingli 
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daquan 性理大全 (The Great Compendium on Humanness and Principle). These 
were allegedly among the first works Jinsai perused in his own studies of Confu-
cian thought (Tucker 1998, 12).
When Jinsai was born the family fortune was already declining, and Jinsai’s father 
wanted his son to pursue medicine, which at the time was a more lucrative profes-
sion, but Jinsai’s own interests lay in other areas. Tucker writes:
As a child and adolescent, Jinsai apparently circulated among Kyōto’s 
cultural elite. Despite the low status of chōnin within a social system 
dominated by samurai, Kyōto chōnin were exceptions, enjoying relatively 
higher prestige and social standing as preservers of traditional arts, crafts, 
and cultural enterprises in the ancient imperial capital. Their standing 
was realized, however, provided that they remained in Kyōto, a world 
somewhat apart from the one that samurai otherwise were prone to rule 
more arrogantly and ruthlessly. (ibid., 32)
When he was ten years old, Jinsai began his formal education under his maternal 
uncle, Ōsuka Kaian 大須賀快庵, a noted physician, and was said to be impressed 
when introduced to the Daxue 大學 (The Great Learning) (Yamashita 1983, 456). 
At eighteen years old he obtained a copy of Yanping Dawen 延平答問 (Dialogues 
with Yanping) and is reported to have read and reread it until its pages disintegrat-
ed (ibid.). This brief work, edited by Zhu Xi, advocates the meditative practice of 
“quiet sitting” (seiza 静座), taught to Zhu Xi by Li Yanping.8 It is quite clear that 
Jinsai was at this time a student of the Cheng-Zhu School Neo-Confucianism.
Tucker also delves into other possible early textual influences. He offers specula-
tion on Jinsai’s own descriptions in the Dōshikai hikki 同志會筆記 (Records of 
the Society of the Like-Minded Scholars), where Jinsai describes having read the 
Great Compendium on Humanness and Structural Coherence and the Zhuzi Yulei 
朱子語類 (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu) at the age of 27. Tucker also 
wonders whether some of those books were not in fact too hard for a beginner 
and whether some of the titles Jinsai describes might not be copies of other ti-
tles, including Beixi’s Xingli Ziyi (Tucker 1998, 37). Unfortunately, Tucker has 
to in the end admit that the question of when Jinsai first read the Ziyi remains 
unresolved (ibid.).
8 John Jorgensen discusses Li Yanping as having “taught a method for the realization of the singular 
pattern or coherence inherent in all divergent particulars, thus underscoring the value and worth of 
phenomenal reality. (…) Li advocated that students could gradually come to empathize with other 
things (and perceive coherence thereby) in the daily functions of life via quiet sitting and cleansing 
the mind” ( Jorgensen 2018, 44).
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Some biographers speculate that Jinsai attended lectures by Matsunaga Sekigo 
松永尺五 (1592–1657), the Kyoto-based Neo-Confucian successor of Fujiwara 
Seika 藤原惺窩 (1561–1619) and at one time the teacher of Jinsai’s cousin, Itō 
Masatomo 伊藤正知, but there is no actual historical proof of this (Tucker 1998, 
38). Other possibilities include Jinsai studying with a fairly obscure and unknown 
teacher or being largely self-taught (ibid.). Yamashita, on the other hand, writes 
that Jinsai did indeed briefly study with Matsunaga, but stopped going to his 
school after only one or two lectures for some unknown reason (Yamashita 1983, 
457). In any case, Jinsai in all probability did not have a very influential figure in 
his early life to study with, and this kind of independence might have also had a 
not insignificant influence on his thought and work.
Jinsai’s pursuit of scholarship was not supported by his family, and in 1655, at the 
age of 29, this drove him into seclusion at the Kyōto Matsushita Ward. It also 
brought upon him a certain illness called, using modern terminology, “a neurosis”, 
one which perhaps worsened by a heart condition or tuberculosis (Tucker 1998, 
41). It is known that at this time, when he was by himself, Jinsai would communi-
cate with people very rarely and barely leave his residence. His illness did not how-
ever stop him from further study, and in those years Jinsai would explore Daoist 
and Buddhist texts, as well as the Neo-Confucian teachings of Wang Yangming 
王陽明 (1472–1559) (ibid., 42). He also established his first study group there, 
the Dōshikai 同志會 (Society of the Like-Minded Scholars).
In 1662, and after a devastating earthquake, Jinsai—now 35 years of age and with 
a firmly renewed faith in the ethical teachings of classical Confucianism—re-
turned to his family residence, where the Dōshikai then began to meet. Out of 
this Jinsai’s School, the Kogidō, would be born, as well as his kogaku philosophy 
(ibid., 46). The inspiration for establishing the school might actually have been the 
Yamazaki Ansai School (Kimonha 崎門派), which stood across the street from the 
Itō family home (ibid.). As Jinsai’s philosophy is often considered as the answer 
to Ansai’s strict Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy, it is interesting to note the differences in 
the two scholar’s teaching methods. 
Tucker writes:
Unlike Ansai, a demanding teacher who supposedly criticized his students 
for not memorizing Zhu Xi’s writing precisely, Jinsai was more deferential, 
tolerant, and gentle in teaching, emulating Confucius’ more liberal and hu-
manistic pedagogical demeanor. The Dōshikai did not emphasize, within 
the classroom at least, differences between students and their teacher. Dis-
tinctions in relative social status were not stressed either. (ibid., 47)
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He also notes: 
To some extent, the differences between Jinsai and Ansai reflected their 
social backgrounds and those of their students. Ansai was the son of a 
rōnin, and his students were mostly bushi, while Jinsai’s school included 
representatives from wealthy chōnin families, prominent lines of Kyōto 
physicians, the cultural elite of the ancient capital, and members of the 
imperial aristocracy from distinguished lines such as the Fujiwara. Per-
haps naturally, a strict and demanding atmosphere more prevailed within 
Ansai’s school than in Jinsai’s. (Tucker 1998, 47–48)
Even though the Kyōto chōnin were afforded some measure of independence, and 
Jinsai himself maintained scholarly independence from samurai patronage (ibid., 
50), the bakufu power was quite evident even in Kyōto. Jinsai, living for a long 
time in the shadow of the imperial castle, could not be unaware of it, nor the wid-
er political situation in the country. It is therefore interesting to note again that 
while Jinsai never directly engaged with the politics of the day, but his project, 
Tucker argues, as a proper Confucian one, must be seen as political and as cham-
pioning the specific chōnin worldview. Jinsai also never wrote any political treatise, 
but his thinking is evident from some of his writings—most especially in his fo-
cusing on the people and his adoption, as has already been mentioned, of the more 
politically liberal ideas of Mencius.
Jinsai is thus a Kogaku scholar, influenced by his life as a chōnin in the ancient im-
perial capital of Kyōto. But it seems that to describe his project primarily in those 
terms might again be an overreach in itself, with the mistake being not taking into 
account Jinsai’s own avowed positions. Jinsai himself never described his project in 
those terms, and it is doubtful that he would have seen it as such, as his ethical phi-
losophy is in his works repeatedly presented in inclusive and universalistic terms, 
while maintaining a quite radical apologia of Confucius and Mencius’s thought.
Jinsai as a Confucian Radical
Koyasu Nobukuni notes Itō Jinsai’s Confucian radicalism in his belief that the 
Analects is the most perfect book in the universe (see Koyasu 2015), and this does 
have a bearing on Jinsai’s project as a whole. In the Gomō jigi Jinsai describes his 
project thusly:
I teach students to scrutinize the Analects and the Mencius thorough-
ly so that they can rightly discern, with their mind’s eye, the semantic 
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lineage of the teachings of the sage Confucius. When so trained, stu-
dents will readily recognize the semantic lineage of Confucian-Mencian 
philosophical notions, and thereby fathom their meanings without error. 





kawa and Shimizu 1971, 14)
But Jinsai’s project also had wider implications. Huang Chun-chieh describes it 
in the following fashion:
The book9 (…) represents a type of Confucian hermeneutics in East-
Asia, a forceful apologia for Confucius against “heresies” of Daoism, 
Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. Jinsai re-interprets Confucius by of-
fering meticulous textual exegesis with fresh intratextual annotations of 
the Analects and faithful definitions of such key notions as dao 道 and ren 
仁 as Confucius himself meant them, on the one hand, and intertextual 
collations of the Analects and the other Classical writings to show their 
mutual coherence, on the other. (Huang 2008, 248)
Jinsai shows himself in many ways to be a radical Confucian, and as an aggressive 
opponent of the notions which he believed were developed in the Buddhist and 
Daoist traditions and which he held to have corrupted the proper Confucian Way. 
But his view of what might be considered properly Confucian is also grounded 
in his own project and methodology. Jinsai found in the Analects and Mencius the 
textual authority to counter the teaching of the Cheng-Zhu School10, but it is not 
that his objections stem from his Confucian radicalism; it is rather that his Con-
fucian radicalism might have stemmed from his objections and search for univer-
sally applicable ethical teaching.
Jinsai went so far as to attack one of the four books—the Great Learning—as a 
non-Confucian text, writing a supplementary essay in the Gomō jigi, titled “Dai-
gaku wa Kōshi no isho ni arazaru” 大學非孔子之遺書辨 (The Great Learning is 
9 The book mentioned here is the Rongo kogi 論語古義 (Ancient Meanings in the Analects) (see Itō 
in Koyasu 2017; Itō in Koyasu 2018), which together with the Gomō jigi represents Jinsai’s most 
valuable work.
10 As has been discussed, this might follow Lu Xiangshan’s method.
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Not a Confucian Text)11. In the introduction to the essay Jinsai writes the words 
most closely associated with his radical Confucian stance:
The words of the Analects are plain and honest (heisei 平正), but its prin-
ciples are deep and profound (shin’on 深穏). Adding even one word would 
be excessive. Taking away one would leave it imperfect. The Analects is 
the most perfect work in literature in the entire world (tenka no gen koko 
ni oite ka kiwamaru 天下之言於是乎極矣). It exhaustively explains the 
principles of the world (tenka no ri koko ni oite ka tsuku 天下之理於是乎
盡矣). It truly is the greatest book in the universe (jitsu ni uchū daiichi no 




いてか尽く。実に宇宙第一の書なり。(Itō in Yoshikawa and Shimi-
zu 1971, 99 & 160–61)
But Koyasu Nobukuni explains Jinsai’s radicalism in different terms, as Jinsai dis-
covering in the Analects a confirmation of his own views on everyday ethics and a 
tool to challenge the Neo-Confucian doctrine (Koyasu 2015, 21–22). Jinsai say-
ing that “to speak of filial piety, brotherly deference, loyalty and trustworthiness 
suffices”12, that “where there are not people, the Way will not be seen”13 shows 
that in exhaustively reading the Analects (and the Mencius), Jinsai not only came 
to possess the language and textual authority to criticize the accounts of Cheng-
Zhu School thought and practice (especially as put forth by the already discussed 
Kimon School of Yamazaki Ansai), but also that his preoccupation, rather than 
doctrinal, remained always with proper everyday ethical life of the people.
Jinsai’s “ten proofs” why the Great Learning is not a Confucian text thus begins 
with his criticism of it as a book that aims at being too lofty and setting out too 
hard a road for the practice of the Confucian Way. Jinsai writes:
But the Great Learning suggests that progress along the moral way is as 
difficult as climbing a nine-story pagoda.14 We mount story after story, 
until finally reaching its pinnacle. Yet the Confucian way is nothing other 
11 This essay was not in the Edo edition of the text, showing how Jinsai’s radicalism might have sub-
sequently been downplayed by his son, Itō Tōgai.
12 惟孝弟忠信を言ふて足れり。
13 人無きときは則ち以て道を見ること無し。(See Itō in Shimizu 2017, 27)
14 See Daodejing, ch. 64.
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than the Way of Humanity (hito no michi 人之道)! Because it was meant 
to be cultivated, how could it be so remote? Confucius himself remarked, 
“Is humaneness far away? As soon as I want it, there it is.”15 Mencius 
added, “The way is close, but can be sought even in distant places.”16 
These passages imply that the way is very close by! Why must we climb a 








wa and Shimizu 1971, 101, 161)
Jinsai’s semantic project then connects to his radicalism concerning the ancient 
meaning of terms found in the Analects and Mencius. But this project comes from 
Jinsai’s own striving for an ethical position which was not exclusive, lofty or hard 
to either understand or achieve; which was not turned to quietism and was not 
built in a way that demanded gradualism or some sort of ultimate attainment: it 
simply demanded the effort of sincerity. It demanded sincere practice. To Jinsai, 
the proper Way is the Way of the human condition itself. It is so fundamentally 
bound to the basic relations of life that going against it would be impossible to do 
and remain recognizably human.
If Jinsai’s stated project is then first and foremost to discover the ancient meanings 
of terms—as opposed to the meanings that have become misunderstood through 
philosophically original interpretations of the Cheng-Zhu School—on the other 
hand, his work (as has been discussed previously) shows that he never lost sight of 
philosophical integrity and also conducted his teachings in a philosophically lib-
eral way. In his striving to formulate coherent philosophical positions, supported 
by the textual authority of the Analects and Mencius, he also seems to be in line 
with his ethical project, much more than it being simply a semantic one.
Huang Chun-chieh also affirms this:
Itō Jinsai thought that the Analects is “the loftiest, the greatest Primal 
Book in the whole universe” precisely because what it conveys are the 
15 仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣 Lunyu, 7/30.
16 道在爾而求諸遠 Mengzi, 4A/11.
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principles of ordinary daily living. Such a Dao bears its inevitable univer-
sality and universal effectiveness. (Huang 2008, 260)
Jinsai’s project should therefore not be seen as strictly doctrinal and based solely 
on textual objections, aimed at purifying Confucian orthodoxy of the influences 
of Buddhism and Daoism (as he himself sees them), but more as a project which 
combines textual, philosophical and practical objections to the kind of ethical 
ideals that each of these traditions might have developed—a project, then, that 
is multi-faceted and complex. Jinsai here is a moralist and an ethicist, trying to 
fathom the teachings he believed to be true to life but also formulate philosoph-
ical answers against developments which he believed damaged the true Dao of 
humanity.
Jinsai’s Project as Centered on the Practice of Virtue
Samuel Hideo Yamashita argues that to understand Jinsai, one has to firmly grasp 
Jinsai’s views on the practice of virtue. He writes:
Although it is commonly believed that Jinsai’s philological studies in-
spired his criticisms of contemporary Neo-Confucian scholars, most 
of whom subscribed to one variety or another of the philosophy of the 
Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi, what has not been recognized is the part 
played by his new method of ethical practice, which he called, following 
Mencius, “nourishment” (yang / yashinau 養). Herein lies the value of 
studying Jinsai’s early life and his preoccupation with the practice of vir-
tue. (Yamashita 1983, 454)
It would be safe to say that Jinsai, as Yamashita points out, was convinced that 
performing acts of virtue was superior to explicating virtue through the study of 
the Confucian classics (ibid., 453), but Yamashita also shows that while Jinsai’s 
enduring motivation for studying Confucian thought and engaging in his phil-
ological work was his attempt to pursue ancient meaning and achieve the prop-
er practice of virtue, it was his inner need first to object to improper practice on 
ethical grounds, defend his objections on textual grounds, and then to finally for-
mulate proper philosophical solutions to the problems that were facing him, that 
formed the core of his project.
The first expressions of Jinsai’s thought are his early essays. Jinsai wrote four short 
essays between 1653 and 1655. They are the “Keisaiki 敬齋記 (Keisai’s Testa-
ment)”, the “Taikyokuron 太極論 (The Doctrine of the Great Ultimate)”, the 
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“Shingakuron 心学論 (The Doctrine of the Learning of the Heart-Mind)”, and 
the “Seizenron 性善論 (The Doctrine of a Felicitous Humanness)”. The essays 
show Jinsai’s knowledge and his interest—in this time still strong—in the Cheng-
Zhu School; but they also show Jinsai’s own preoccupations at the time were 
mainly with finding answers to the problems he was facing in his own life: aliena-
tion from his family and not being ready to follow their wishes for him as a son.17
Jinsai’s anguish enhanced the appeal of Cheng-Zhu philosophy, and 
Cheng-Zhu philosophy, as he interpreted it, salved his loneliness by 
sanctioning his interest in himself. Jinsai’s separation from family and 
friends and his enormous self-absorption are the keys to his earliest writ-
ings. (Yamashita 1983, 458)
It would be during this time that Jinsai would slowly become more and more dis-
illusioned with the Cheng-Zhu School, and he now tried to find answers further 
afield—in both Daoist and Buddhist texts and practices as well as in the teach-
ings of Wang Yangming. Furthermore, Jinsai also sought personal healing in dif-
ferent kinds of meditation, as he seemed to recognize its power to bring peace to 
his troubled mind; but he also slowly recognized in meditative practices a deep 
antisocial streak, which he finally grew to reject. Jinsai’s own description of medi-
tation in quite striking, as it shows how he thought about it later in his life. Jinsai 
would describe his memories of the so-called “skeleton meditation” in the follow-
ing fashion:
The Zen Buddhists have a practice of meditating on skeletons. In this 
method, the devotee first sits quietly, reflecting on himself. When his 
concentration is complete, he sees himself as a skeleton, stripped of all 
flesh, and for that moment he is above lamenting his unenlightened state. 
In my youth, I tried this technique. Sure enough, when I had achieved 
complete concentration, I saw the skeleton in myself. I also imagined 
that when I spoke to anyone, I was conversing with another skeleton, and 
passersby appeared to be walking puppets, and everything seemed to be 
a dream: there was neither Heaven nor Earth, neither life nor death; and 
everything, even mountains, rivers and palatial mansions, appeared phan-
tasmal. This is what the Buddhists call clarifying the mind and glimpsing 
one’s humanness. I recall too that filial piety and loyalty seemed shallow 
and barely worth discussing. After I had practiced quiet sitting for some 
time, I regained my lucidity, and my views came naturally. (I know now 
17 This might be said to represent a true Confucian crisis of identity.
Azijske_studije_2021_2_FINAL.indd   202 6. 05. 2021   12:47:39
203Asian Studies IX (XXV ), 2 (2021), pp.  183–208
that) these were not the ‘real principles of Heaven and Earth’ and that 
it is because of practices such as this that Buddhists sever all ties with 














来れり。(Itō in Ishida 1960, 37–38).
From such experiences Jinsai’s distrust of both the practice of meditation and of 
the Buddhist interpretations of notions that formed its theoretical background—
as well as a distrust of what Jinsai called Zen-Confucian practices, such as the 
aforementioned “quiet sitting”—would emerge. Jinsai would go on to spend his 
life fighting quietism in Confucian practice as well as what he perceived as qui-
etist principles in Neo-Confucian thought. This is without doubt another major 
part of his project: a possible starting point. That the experiences were so viscer-
al to Jinsai shows that his shift in thinking was not born from simple doctrinal 
dislike of Cheng-Zhu school’s thought, but from his experiences and his own 
attempts to come to terms with them. Jinsai struggled with being human and 
sought solutions both philosophical and practical.
In 1658 Jinsai wrote another short essay, the “Jinsetsu 仁説 (Theory of Hu-
maneness)”; and in 1661 he wrote the “Shosai shishū 書齋私祝 (A Student’s 
Pledge)”. In both of them, Jinsai would completely renounce his former self-ob-
session as well as his Cheng-Zhu influenced views on individualism and sociabil-
ity. He would become a staunch defender of the Confucian values of filial piety 
and brotherly love and would also radically shift the focus of his studies from the 
Neo-Confucian notion of seriousness (jing / kei 敬) to the study of the Confucian 
notion of humaneness (ren / jin 仁).18
18 This even shows in his choice of a name. Before this time, Jinsai 仁斎 took for himself the name of 
Keisai 敬斎.
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It would seem that this was also a deep personal shift for Jinsai, the once rebel 
son, and it formed the backbone of the further development of his thought. Soon 
after, Jinsai’s family home was struck by disaster and Jinsai returned there, where 
he, in time, established his famous school, the Kogidō. And of course, Yamashita 
demonstrates by looking at both Jinsai’s writings as well as those of his son Tōgai 
that the shift in his thinking did not happen all at once, but was developed over 
many years, most of it between 1662–1677, when returning home he held the 
many meetings of the Dōshikai (ibid.)
This interim period is important because it was then that Jinsai ques-
tioned the adequacy of his earlier textual solution to the problem posed 
by his affirmation of the emotions and began to search for another, more 
satisfying solution. His writings from this period, which include his lec-
tures, the topics he raised for discussion in the meetings of the [Society 
of Like-minded Scholars], and the notes of these meetings, chronicle 
this search. From them we learn that Jinsai first sought philosophical 
solutions, then practical ones, and also that the former led to and perhaps 
even necessitated the latter. (Yamashita 1983, 466)
In this shift, Jinsai also encountered a problem of Zhu Xi’s formulation of hu-
maneness as “the li of love”19 as described through Zhu Xi’s duality of li 理 and qi 
氣. Jinsai, with his newfound respect for sociality, was afraid that humaneness and 
human feelings had become too divided by Zhu Xi’s formulation. It was to this 
concrete question, Yamashita argues, that Jinsai sought his answers and it was this 
question that in the end led him to abandon important aspects of the established 
duality (ibid., 462). But Jinsai’s answers, at first, were based more or less on the 
simple textual authority of the Analects and Mencius.
Yamashita argues that Jinsai, having in a strictly ethical sense found himself at odds 
with elements of Neo-Confucian practice, which to his mind belonged instead to Bud-
dhist and Daoist traditions, found in the Analects and Mencius the textual authority 
needed to support his own philosophical views, and through this tried to resolve his 
problems with Zhu Xi’s formulation of the notion of humaneness. At first, however, he 
did this while still trying to preserve the duality found in the teachings of the Cheng-
Zhu School. Later he began to question such textual solutions, which he found un-
satisfying, and started searching for more complete philosophical ones (ibid., 468–69).
I will not be discussing here in what ways Jinsai finally managed to resolve the du-
ality between li and qi. For the purposes of the present article, it is more important 
19 See, for example, Zhuzi yulei, 6.
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to note that Jinsai did in fact go on to formulate philosophical solutions which 
brought together human feelings and the inner disposition of goodness, and 
therefore in a certain sense achieved a re-valuation of the given duality, by as-
serting that “people having the same sense of right and wrong is what was earlier 
referred to as the feeling of commiseration” (trans. Yamashita in Yamashita 1983, 
472; Itō 1717, vol. 4). Thus Jinsai, having combined the original humanness and 
human feeling, came to a more satisfying philosophical solution, which would 
have both ontological and ethical consequences.
But he was still not satisfied with this, as Yamashita writes:
Jinsai recognized that although he had found an easy textual solution and 
then a more satisfying philosophical solution to the problem of reconcil-
ing virtue and the emotions, he had not found a practical solution, that 
is, an appropriate method of actually embodying virtue. What may have 
drawn him to Wang Yang-ming, then, was the latter’s advocacy of both a 
monistic ontology20 and an active form of praxis. (ibid., 473)
In 1662, Jinsai was busy trying to synthesize the views of Mencius and Wang 
Yangming and primarily interested in the proper practice of virtue. He would later 
go on to reject Yangming’s solutions through embarking on his own philological 
project, and finally accepting Mencius’ notion of nourishment as the one proper 
practice to settle upon.21 However, while even his rejection of the Great Learning 
as a Confucian text is based on the exact argument that it stresses introspection 
above nourishment (Yamashita 1983, 478), Jinsai does not deny the value of in-
trospection, but simply argues against any kind of order in which it comes before 
“nourishment”. Still, it is safe to say that Jinsai’s philological project, while surely 
driven by his search for classical textual authority and proper practice of virtue, 
was just as much driven by Jinsai’s need to formulate a proper philosophical re-
sponse to the prevailing doctrines of his time.
Conclusion
Jinsai’s project can thus be traced from his ethical objections, in certain ways influ-
enced by his chōnin life, to his search for textual authority through which to counter 
20 Whether Wang Yangming had indeed formulated a monistic ontology can be disputed.
21 Yamashita writes: “Although it is possible that his decision to emphasize nourishment, albeit aimed 
at Yang-ming, was influenced by the latter’s glorification of action, Jinsai did not acknowledge this 
influence but instead cited the Mencius as his locus classicus, as if this were sufficient authority.” 
(Yamashita 1983, 475)
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the quietist elements of the Cheng-Zhu School’s interpretations, his attempts to 
formulate a philosophical solution to the problems posed, and on to practical solu-
tions: a search for the proper practice of virtue. His radical views of the Analects and 
its ethical universality can be seen as no less important than his status as a towns-
man of the City of Kyōto and his philosophical work of establishing ancient mean-
ing within the genre of philosophical lexicography can be seen as no less important 
than his textual objections to overreaching interpretational and commentarial work. 
But his final goal is clearly not simply contemplative, it is also decidedly practical.
Still, even though the philosophical work of Jinsai might perhaps be seen as nei-
ther the starting point, nor the actual goal, it can also be said to be the central ac-
tivity that holds his project together. In this sense, philosophy to Jinsai might be 
seen as the means to an end, but that is also very much in line with the Confucian 
tradition. As John Allen Tucker has pointed out, Jinsai can certainly be regarded 
as one of the early-modern Tokugawa philosophers, and his work on Confucian 
ethics can be seen as important to that project. As his work had thus been shown 
to represent a specific mix of methods and influences, his own project can be con-
sidered as multi-faceted but also as philosophically relevant.
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sai, Itō Tōgai” Nihon shisō taikei 33「伊藤仁斎•伊藤東涯」日本思想体系 
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